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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, 
Utah Code Ann. SS 78-2-2 (3) (e) (i i) and 63-46b-16 and Rule 14 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE 1 
A. Issue: Is the sale of BJ-Titan Services Company's 
oil and gas well stimulation services incidental to the sale of 
tangible personal property? 
B. Standard of Review: Correction of error with no 
deference to Commission interpretations. Chris & Dick's Lumber 
and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d 
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
ISSUE 2 
A. Issue: Do the services BJ-Titan Services Company 
provides with respect to "cementing" of oil and gas wells make it 
a real property contractor subject to payment of sales taxes on 
the cement it purchases at wholesale rather than the collector of 
sales taxes on cement it sells at retail? 
B. Standard of Review: Correction of error with no 
deference to Commission interpretations. Chris & Dick's Lumber 
and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d 
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
ISSUE 3 
A, Issue: Is the transfer of motor vehicles from BJ 
Hughes Holding Company to BJ-Titan Services Company an "isolated 
or occasional" sale, and thus outside the scope of a taxable 
"retail sale" as defined in Utah Code S 59-15-2(5) (1985-1989)? 
B. Standard of Review: Correction of error with no 
deference to Commission interpretations. Chris & Dick's Lumber 
and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d 
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
In the alternative to Issue 3f BJ-Titan Services Com-
pany asserts the following: 
ISSUE 4 
A. Issue: Is there "substantial evidence" to support 
the Commission's Finding that the "aggregate rule" for taxing the 
transfer of motor vehicles did not exist? 
B. Standard of Review: Substantial evidence test 
with no deference to Commission findings. Hurley v. Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 
(footnote 3) (Utah 1988); Pickering v. Board of Education of 
Township High School District, 391 U.S. 563, 578 (footnote 2) 
(1968). See footnote 1 to the Docketing Statement. 
If the Court rules in BJ-Titan Services Company's favor 
on Issue 4 then it should decide the following: 
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ISSUE 5 
A. Issue: Can the Commission lawfully disregard the 
"aggregate rule" as practiced by its Auditing Division and Motor 
Vehicles Division without promulgating a contrary rule pursuant 
to the Utah Rulemaking Act? 
B. Standard of Review: Correction of error with no 
deference to Commission interpretations. Chris & Dick's Lumber 
and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d 
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
For the years at issue in this proceeding, Utah Code 
S 59-15-4 (1985-1986) provides in relevant part: 
From and after the effective date of this act 
there is levied and there shall be collected 
and paid: 
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of 
tangible personal property made within the 
state of Utah. . . A 
Utah Code S 59-15-2(2) (1985-1986) defines "sale" or 
"sales/ in relevant part, as follows: 
(2) "Sale" or "sales" includes install-
ment and credit sales, every closed transac-
tion constituting a sale, and also includes 
the sale of electrical energy, gas, services, 
1
 See Utah Code S 59-12-103 (1990-1991) for the current text of 
the statute. 
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or entertainment tangible under the terms of 
this act.2 
Utah Code $ 59-15-2(5) (1985-1986) provides in relevant 
part: 
[B]ut the term "retail sale" is not intended 
to include isolated nor occasional sales by 
persons not regularly engaged in business, 
. • . but no sale of a vehicle of a type 
required to be registered under the provi-
sions of the motor vehicles laws of this 
state shall be deemed isolated or occasional 
for the purposes of this act, except that any 
transfer of any motor vehicle in a business 
reorganization where the ownership of the 
transferee organization is substantially the 
same as to the ownership of the transferor 
organization shall be considered an isolated 
or occasional sale.3 
Utah Code SS 59-15-2 and 59-15-4 (1985-1986), Rules 
865-1S, 865-2S, 865-26S, 865-27S, 865-38S and 865-58S of the 
Administrative Rules of the Utah State Tax Commission, applicable 
in this matter, are set forth in their entirety in Appendix A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
t. NATURE OF CASE. 
This is a petition for review by BJ-Titan Services Com-
pany ("BJ-Titan") from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Final Decision ("Final Decision") of the Utah State Tax Com-
mission (the "Commission"), dated July 2, 1990 (Appeal No. 
2
 See Utah Code S 59-12-102(8) (a) (1990-1991) for the current 
definition of "retail sale." 
3
 See Utah Code S 59-12-104(14) (1990-1991) for the current text 
of this provision which has been recodified as an exemption. 
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88-1644), holding that BJ-Titan failed to establish by a prepon-
derance of evidence that (1) its oil and gas stimulation services 
are exempt from sales and use tax and (2) the transfer of motor 
vehicles from BJ-Hughes Holding Company to BJ-Titan was exempt 
from sales and use taxes. Record at 63. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
This proceeding is a consolidation of two cases: 
Hughes Tool Company v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, Appeal No. 88-1500 and BJ-Titan Services Company v. 
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal No. 
88-1644. The nature of the issues in both of these appeals is 
the same, except that the Hughes Tool Company appeal does not 
involve the "isolated or occasional sales" or "business reorgani-
zation" issue present in BJ-Titan Services Company. Record at 
53-54.4 
On February 21, 1989, the Commission held a Formal 
Hearing. At the Formal Hearing, BJ-Titan argued that its cement-
ing, fracturing and acidizing services were non-taxable service 
transactions independent of and not incidental to the sale of 
tangible personal property. Alternatively, BJ-Titan argued that 
it was a real property contractor because it converted tangible 
personal property into real property pursuant to its service con-
tracts. Accordingly, the non-material (service) portion of the 
service contracts represent non-taxable services. Second, 
4
 Accordingly, the facts and legal arguments set forth herein 
equally apply to Hughes Tool Company. 
-5-
BJ-Titan argued that the creation of a new business entity to 
carry out the same line of business being conducted by its incor-
porators (1) qualifies as an "isolated or occasional sale"; 
(2) falls within a reasonable and logical interpretation of a 
"business reorganization"; or (3) the Commission failed to follow 
established procedure of taxing business reorganizations on an 
"aggregate" basis. 
III. DECISION OF THE COMMISSION. 
On July 2, 1990, the Commission entered its Final Deci-
sion, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B. In its 
Final Decision the Commission ruled that BJ-Titan "failed to 
establish by a preponderance of evidence that its oil and gas 
stimulation services are exempt from sales and use tax." Record 
at 63. The Commission ruled that BJ-Titan's stimulation services 
constituted the sale of tangible personal property. Record at 
60-61. Additionally, the Commission ruled that BJ-Titan was not 
a real property contractor. Record at 61-62. Finally the Com-
mission held that BJ-Titan did not qualify for the isolated or 
occasional sale exemption because "it cannot be said that the 
ownership of the transferee organization (BJ-Titan) is substan-
tially the same as the ownership of the transferrer organization 
(BJ-Holding Company)" pursuant to Rule 865-19-38S. Record at 63. 
The Commission also rejected BJ-Titan1s argument that 
in not following the "aggregate theory" the Commission was imper-
missibly changing its policy. In so ruling the Commission 
rejected the testimony of a former Assistant Director at the 
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Commission as insufficient evidence to establish that such a pol-
icy existed. Record at 63. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. BJ-Titan provides a full range of primary and 
remedial oil and gas well stimulation services for well owners 
and operators throughout the United States and Canada. Record at 
134. The well stimulation services which BJ-Titan provides may 
be generally subdivided into three basic types: cementing, 
hydraulic fracturing and acidizing. Transcript ("Tr.") 70. 
2. The purpose of performing well stimulation ser-
vices is to improve and enhance the production of a well through 
various "flow improvement mechanisms." Tr. 40, 72. These flow 
improvement mechanisms are analogous to creating a lateral well 
bore. Id. BJ-Titan1s customers are primarily interested in pur-
chasing a result - improved well performance - rather than the 
materials, such as chemicals, used to achieve that result. Tr. 
138. 
3. Approximately 8% of the services involved in the 
audit deficiencies issued against BJ-Titan are of the hydraulic 
fracturing and acidizing types. Tr. 35. Hydraulic fracturing 
involves the injection of various hydraulic fluids into the well 
bore that are treated with various additives that often include 
"propping agents" - small spherical man-made and natural compo-
nents - which extend the well bore laterally into the geographic 
formation. Tr. 71. Acidizing is an extension of hydraulic frac-
turing. Chemicals are pumped into the well bore to dissolve 
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channels in the rockr plug channels, or remove scale deposits. 
Tr. 72. Fracturing and acidizing involve the application of var-
ious sophisticated and specialized techniques that vary with each 
individual well. Tr. 71. Many decisions relating to fracturing 
and acidizing are made on location. Tr. 78. See Exhibit 1 
(Record at 133-158) for a more detailed description of services 
rendered in fracturing and acidizing operations. 
4. Approximately 92% of the services involved in the 
audit deficiencies issued against BJ-Titan are "cementing" ser-
vices. Tr. 35. The purpose of cementing treatment is to place 
various cementing compositions and other slurry compositions at 
strategic places in the well. The most important type of cement-
ing is primary cementing in which BJ-Titan places a cement slurry 
in the annular portion of the well between the hole that has been 
drilled and the casing that has been run into the well. Tr. 71. 
Cementing requires a variety of specialized techniques. Every 
well is different. Tr. 71. BJ-Titan Services does not sell 
cement per se but sells cementing services. Tr. 76. See Exhibit 
1 (Record at 133-158) and Exhibit B to Petition for Agency Action 
(Record at 373-404) for a more detailed description of services 
involved in cementing operations. 
5. Because of the complexity of properly placing the 
cement, well pressures, heat, curing time, etc., cementing may 
require a variety of additives from any of 54 possibilities 
including bentonites, sodium metascilicates, lignins for 
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retarding agents, calcium chlorides, etc. to ensure proper forma-
tion, placement and sealing. Tr. 77. 
6. The basic function of cementing is to isolate the 
"pay zones" from other zones, such as a fresh water zone. 
Cementing also supports the well. Without cementing, there is a 
good chance that the pipe could collapse. Tr. 82. 
7. To perform any oil well stimulation service 
requires much on-the-job technical training, as well as special 
classroom training. Tr. 68. The oil well owner or operator 
could not perform any of the services BJ-Titan provides because 
he does not have the specialized equipment, training or the 
expertise. Tr. 41. Much technique goes into every single job. 
Tr. 71. To perform cementing operations, a knowledge of the well 
hole and geological formations is necessary. Tr. 93. 
8. The cement, once implaced in the well, becomes a 
permanent and integral part of the well and cannot be removed, if 
at all, without substantial damage to the well. Tr. 143. 
9. Various devices, such as "float collars," "float 
shoe centralizers," "scratchers" and "plugs" which determine the 
flow, form and placement of the cement, are placed on the casing 
and lowered into the well. In some instances the well operator 
will attach these devices to the casing. Typically, the oil well 
operator lowers the casing into the well. BJ-Titan always per-
forms the pumping services and always supervises the entire oper-
ation. Tr. 88, 113, 124. BJ-Titan customers do not, at any 
time, physically perform any of the well stimulation services. 
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Tr. 92. Typically, BJ-Titan makes a proposal as to what services 
are needed and a decision as to how to proceed, subject to cus-
tomer approval. Tr. 103. 
10. BJ-Titan bills its customers for the entire cost 
of services rendered and materials provided; however, the sepa-
rate material and service costs of each invoice are identified as 
separate line items in the invoice. Tr. at 63. 
11. The service or labor component of BJ-Titan1s 
invoices varies with each contract. On average, the materials 
portion of an invoice is approximately 31 percent. Tr. 215. On 
some invoices the materials portion is as low as 8.5 percent. 
Tr. 168. On others it is higher than the 31 percent average. 
Tr. 52. The balance of the invoice price would be for the exper-
tise required and services rendered. 
12. BJ-Titan collected and remitted sales taxes for 
tangible personal property sold to its customers. It did not 
collect or remit sales taxes for services. Record at 56. 
13. The Auditing Division did not impose sales taxes 
upon well stimulation services prior to the audit of BJ-Titan 
being challenged herein. Tr. 154, 155. 
14. BJ-Titan is a Texas general partnership estab-
lished in 1985 by BJ Hughes Holding Company, a subsidiary of 
Hughes Tool Company, and Titan Services, a subsidiary of Dresser 
Industries, Inc. In forming BJ-Titan, BJ Hughes Holding Company 
and Titan Services each contributed assets, including motor vehi-
cles, to the newly formed BJ-Titan. Tr. 26, 27. BJ Hughes 
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Holding Company contributed 72% of the assets, including the 
motor vehicles at issue, to BJ-Titan and received a 72% interest 
in the partnership. Tr. 28. 
15. Each of the entities forming BJ-Titan was in the 
well stimulation business prior to formation of the partnership. 
The business purpose in forming the partnership was to achieve 
economies of scale. BJ Hughes Holding Company contributed the 
entire line of business or operations constituting its oil and 
gas well stimulation services. Afterwards, all stimulation ser-
vices conducted by BJ Hughes Holding Company were conducted 
through the partnership. Tr. 28-31. 
16. The motor vehicles contributed to the partnership 
were titled and registered in Texas with Texas apportionment 
plates. Tr. at 66. 
17. Prior to 1987, the Auditing Division employed the 
"aggregate rule" for taxing the transfer of motor vehicles in a 
business reorganization. Under this policy, the Commission's 
Auditing Division imposed a sales tax on assets transferred to a 
partnership based upon the non-contributing partner's equity own-
ership in the partnership. For example, if a corporation trans-
ferred a $10,000 vehicle to a partnership in exchange for a 70% 
partnership interest, the partnership would pay sales tax upon 
$3,000 rather than $10,000. Tr. 160, 161. 
18. The Director of the Auditing Division was aware 
that the "aggregate rule" was practiced by the Commission. The 
Assistant Director sent a memorandum to the Commission asking for 
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clarification of the rule. Tr. 162, Hearing Exhibit 5, Record at 
226. On September 23, 1987, the Utah Attorney General acknowl-
edged the existence of the "aggregate rule" in an informal opin-
ion but recommended that it be changed to the "entity rule," 
which would tax 100% of the transfer in the above example. Tr. 
186, Hearing Exhibit 6, Record at 228. 
19. The Commission never promulgated a rule, issued a 
bulletin or made any other official or unofficial announcement 
that its policy relating to the taxation of well stimulation ser-
vices had been changed from no-taxation to taxation, or that the 
"aggregate rule" had been replaced by the "entity rule." Tr. 
250. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. SERVICES RENDERED UNDER BJ-TITAN'S WELL STIM-
ULATION OPERATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT 
INCIDENTAL TO THE SALE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY. 
The Commission erred in ruling that the well stimula-
tion services rendered by BJ-Titan are incidental to the sale of 
tangible personal property and thus taxable. In so ruling, the 
Commission also failed to properly construe a taxing statute in 
favor of the taxpayer as required by Utah case law. The record 
clearly demonstrates that services rendered in acidizing, frac-
turing and cementing activities are a significant and substantial 
element of BJ-Titan1s well stimulation operations, and are the 
essence of what BJ-Titan1s customers bargain for and purchase. 
These services are not incidental to the sale of tangible 
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personal property, either as a percentage of total contract cost 
or required technical expertise necessary to complete a project. 
The Commission erroneously applied the case law under 
McKendrick v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177 
(1959) to the facts of this case. McKendrick is distinguishable 
and thus inapplicable. In McKendrick, the services rendered were 
in conjunction with the manufacture or production of a finished 
product. Direct labor was applied to raw materials and the syn-
thesis of the two resulted in a proportionately more valuable 
finished product. However, the services rendered by BJ-Titan has 
little relation to the manufacture of raw materials into a pro-
portionately more valuable finished product. The essence of 
BJ-Titan's operations is providing the expertise and technical 
know-how for the proper placement and use of chemicals or cement 
in various combinations and at specific locations in a well. 
These services include research, modeling, testing and other ana-
lytical services; i.e., non-manufacturing service-type activi-
ties. While additives are mixed in the cement, the mixing does 
not create a more valuable product. Instead, the additives 
decrease or increase hydration as necessary depending on well 
conditions. Once hydration is complete, the product is still 
concrete. Its value has not been increased by the synthesis of 
labor and raw material to create a new finished product. 
The uncontroverted facts of this case are similar to 
the facts and holding of Hardy v. State Tax Commission, 561 P.2d 
1064 (Utah 1977) where this Court recognized that while tangible 
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personal property conveyed to dental patients should be taxed, 
the knowledge, training and expertise of a dentist rendered to 
patients represents services that are not incidental to the sale 
of tangible personal property and thus not subject to taxation. 
II. IF SERVICES ARE INCIDENTAL TO THE SALE OF 
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY, THEN UNDER UTAH 
CASE LAW BJ-TITAN MUST BE A REAL PROPERTY 
CONTRACTOR. 
With respect to cementing services, BJ-Titan is a real 
property contractor because it converts tangible personal prop-
erty into real property (the placement of concrete into a well). 
The Commission completely ignores the uncontroverted record, 
especially the fact that BJ-Titan is the party responsible for 
the installation of cement in the oil or gas well, which then 
becomes a permanent addition to the real property. BJ-Titan is 
the party hired to place cement in the well and is the last party 
who has control over the tangible personal property prior to its 
permanent fixture to real property. Finally, the Commission's 
determination that BJ-Titan is not a real property contractor is 
without merit or logic and is arbitrary. In concluding 
BJ-Titan1s services should be subject to a sales tax, the Commis-
sion ruled that BJ-Titanfs services were "a necessary component 
of the final product." Record at 60. There is no such test 
under Utah law. The Commission also ruled that it was the syn-
thesis of BJ-Titan's services and the materials which produced a 
taxable finished product. Record at 60. However, on the "real 
property contractor issue," the Commission inconsistently and 
blatantly ignores these prior findings to conclude that BJ-Titan 
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did not convert the cement or other materials into real property 
and thus was not a real property contractor. 
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES TO 
BJ-TITAN IS AN ISOLATED OR OCCASIONAL SALE 
AND THUS EXEMPT FROM UTAH SALES AND USE 
TAXES. 
BJ Hughes Holding Company's transfer of motor vehicles 
to BJ-Titan qualifies as an isolated or occasional sale which for 
the applicable years falls outside the definition of a "retail 
sale" subject to taxation. BJ Hughes Holding Company contributed 
its entire line of business which operated the well stimulation 
services to the partnership (BJ-Titan). Utah case law and Rule 
38S states that the sale of an entire business qualifies as an 
isolated or occasional sale, except for motor vehicles required 
to be titled or registered in Utah. As set forth in the record, 
the motor vehicles transferred to the partnership were titled and 
registered in Texas with Texas apportionment plates. As 
interstate commercial vehicles, owned by a non-resident of Utah 
and registered in another state, these vehicles are exempt from 
Utah titling and registration requirements. See Utah Code 
S 41-1-19. Thus the transfer qualifies as an isolated or 
occasional sale. 
In any event, the contribution of assets to a partner-
ship qualifies as a business reorganization because BJ Hughes 
Holding Company has a substantial continuing proprietary interest 
in the underlying business operations of BJ-Titan. 
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IV. THE AUDITING DIVISION FOLLOWED A POLICY OF 
TAXING MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSFERS ON AN AGGRE-
GATE BASIS. 
In the alternative to Argument III discussed above, 
BJ-Titan should be taxed using the "aggregate" rule, by which 
sales taxes are imposed on assets transferred to a partnership 
based upon the non-contributing partner's equity percentage in 
the partnership. The Commission ignored testimony of a former 
Assistant Director of its Auditing Division and supporting docu-
mentary evidence to erroneously conclude this policy did not 
exist. 
V. THE COMMISSION CANNOT MAKE A CHANGE IN POLICY 
WITHOUT A RULEMAKING PROCEEDING. 
The Commission cannot reverse the "aggregate" rule to 
impose taxes under an "entity" theory without compliance with the 
Utah Rulemaking Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SERVICES RENDERED UNDER BJ-TITAN'S WELL STIM-
ULATION OPERATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT 
INCIDENTAL TO THE SALE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY. 
Utah Code S 59-15-4 (1985-1986) provides that tangible 
personal property and certain services set forth therein are sub-
ject to taxation. Clearly absent from Utah Code S 59-15-4 
(1985-1986) is any reference to services rendered in connection 
with the acidizing, fracturing or cementing operations BJ-Titan 
provides. Accordingly, the only instance in which these services 
may be subject to the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 (the "Act") 
is if they are rendered incidental to the sale of tangible 
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personal property. If these services are not incidental, they 
5 
cannot be taxed. 
The Commission's Final Decision either confuses or 
ignores the distinction between an exemption from sales taxes 
(which BJ-Titan does not seek) and a misapplication of the Act to 
activities not within its coverage. The distinction is important 
because an exemption assumes that taxation is appropriate but for 
the exemption. A misapplication, as in this case, results when 
the Commission applies the Act to sales that are not taxable in 
the first instance. 
Contrary to the Commission's Final Decision, BJ-Titan 
does not seek an exemption from the imposition of a sales tax; 
rather, it contests the applicability of a sales tax on services 
not specifically identified in the statute, and which are not 
incidental to the sale of tangible personal property. For that 
reason, the Commission should have construed the Act liberally in 
7 . . . 
the taxpayer's favor. It did not. Rather, ignoring this 
requirement, the Commission narrowly construed the applicability 
5
 See Butler v. State Tax Commission. 13 Utah 241, 367 P.2d 
852 (1962) and Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526 (1935). 
6
 The Commission ruled that BJ-Titan's "oil and gas stimula-
tion services are [not] exempt from sales and use tax." (Empha-
sis added). Record at 63. 
7
 See Oqden Union Railway and Depot Company v. State Tax Com-
mission, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 (1964); Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Company v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 421, 347 
P.2d 179 (1959). 
-17-
of the Act against BJ-Titan to conclude that BJ-Titan is a 
retailer of tangible personal property, contrary to the estab-
lished record and without statutory authority. This conclusion 
requires a specific finding that the rendition of well stimula-
tion services was incidental to sale of tangible personal prop-
erty. The Commission made no such finding. The Commission's 
conclusion is incorrect and not supported by the uncontroverted 
record. 
BJ-Titan went to great lengths to establish and empha-
size the extensive and substantial service element involved in 
each well stimulation operation. The services rendered are far 
from being incidental. David Cramer, a technical manager at 
BJ-Titan, gave lengthy testimony as to the extensive research, 
technology, testing, modeling, analysis of oil and well condi-
tions, etc. which go into each well operation. 
As the key to BJ-Titan operations is the proper place-
ment of cement or chemicals into critical zones in a well, much 
of these services revolves around ascertaining the conditions and 
parameters of the well body and various pay zones. It is these 
analytical services which represent the knowledge, technology and 
expertise that BJ-Titan has to offer and for which it is compen-
sated. Mr. Cramer's uncontroverted testimony as to the substan-
tial services provided is compelling. For example, the record 
includes the following (Tr. 76): 
Q (By Mr. Miller) Mr. Cramer, do the oil 
well owners have the expertise to perform 
these services for themselves? 
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A No. Specialized equipment is necessary, 
and other technical guidance is very neces-
sary. It's a very specialized business. 
Tr. 79 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer): 
So it requires a lot of knowledge about the 
formation. You may adequately stimulate a 
sandstone with an acid treatment. You may 
destroy it also. So limestones are typically 
more frequently acidized . . . . And, again, 
a lot of chemical understanding needs to go 
into every acidizing treatment. You need to 
get samples of the oil from that well or 
nearby well. You have to know about the for-
mation. 
Tr. 71-72 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer): 
A Okay. With our cementing operations, 
the express intent of a cementing treatment 
is to place various cementing compositions, 
fluids, slurry compositions, which we'll get 
into at various places in the well . . . . 
And there is a variety of specialized tech-
niques that accomplish that. And every well 
is a different case. 
A lot of technique has to go into every 
single job. . . . You have to use various 
techniques that are going to vary with each 
individual formation to accomplish this. 
Tr. 138 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer): 
Q (By Mr. Miller) A follow-up question to 
that. If I understand what you just told me, 
does that mean that your customer is not buy-
ing chemicals but is buying a result; i.e., 
an expanded well bore? 
A Exactly. That customer in that slide 
before was very happy that his well went from 
zero to 200 barrels a day. He was less 
interested in the details. 
But, of course, the details made every-
thing. It was—you know, a lot of technique 
went into achieving that result. 
Q Does it matter to the customer whether 
you use chemical X or chemical Y? 
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A As long as it achieves a certain func-
tion, it hardly ever matters. It's usually 
our recommendation. 
Further citations of the record would establish the 
8 
same point. The services referenced above and those further 
discussed in the record are the essence of BJ-Titanfs operations. 
It is these services for which BJ-Titan is hired and paid. By no 
standard are these services inconsequential or incidental. For 
this reason, on the average approximately 70% (Tr. at 215) of the 
contract price for any given job is attributable to the service 
element inherent therein. 
Ignoring this uncontroverted testimony about the exten-
sive scope and nature of services rendered by BJ-Titan, the Com-
mission ruled that BJ-Titan was a "retailer of tangible personal 
property." Record at 60. The Commission concluded that the 
chemicals and cement BJ-Titan furnishes were not incidental to 
the services being rendered and should be taxed. In fact, the 
Commission's Final Decision quotes from its Auditing Division's 
brief that "the materials without the services to blend them into 
the correct product and deliver it into the property would be 
likewise be of for [sic] less value." Record at 60. 
This statement evinces the misapplication of the law in 
this case. While the transfer of tangible personal property may 
8
 The technical expertise, analysis, operations, and decisions 
that go into each well stimulation operation are further 
explained and exemplified in Exhibit 1 (Record at 133) and an 
Article by Dwight Smith for the Society of Petroleum Engineers on 
Cementing. (Record at 373). 
-20-
be taxed, services which are not specifically set forth in Sec-
tion 59-15-4 cannot be taxed, unless they are incidental to the 
sale of tangible personal property. Thus there must be a spe-
cific finding that the services BJ-Titan renders are in fact 
incidental to the sale of tangible personal property. 
The Commission failed to cite any case law, statute or 
other relevant authority to support a conclusion that these ser-
vices are incidental to the sale of tangible personal property. 
There was no testimony or evidence presented at the Formal Hear-
ing that these services are incidental. The Commission made no 
specific finding that these services were incidental to the sale 
of tangible personal property. The only finding the Commission 
made was that these services were a "necessary component of the 
final product." Record at 60. Again, this shows an improper 
construction and application of the law. Nowhere has this stan-
dard ever been used. The proper test is whether the provision of 
services is "incidental" to the sale of tangible personal prop-
erty, not "necessary." For example, the services to install a 
purchased washing machine are taxed not because they are neces-
sary (the washing machine is of little u^e unless installed), but 
because they are incidental to the sal|e. On the other hand, 
while the services of an orthodontist are necessary to correct a 
patient's overbite, the services are not taxed because they are 
not incidental to the sale of the materials used for braces even 
though those materials may represent 20-30% of the total cost of 
the orthodontic work. The focus is on whether the services are 
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incidental, not the materials. The value of the materials being 
furnished is not pertinent to the proper inquiry. 
The Tax Commission made the same mistake its Auditing 
Division made at the Formal Hearing. It did not apply the proper 
test. The Auditing Division's Hearing Memorandum argued that 
"petitioner's transfers of tangible personal property are not 
just incidental to the services being provided." Record at 298 
(emphasis added). Once again, the incidental nature (or lack 
thereof) of the transferred tangible personal property vis-a-vis 
services rendered is not the issue here. It is the opposite; 
i.e., whether those services are incidental to the sale of tangi-
ble personal property. The Auditing Division argued, and the 
Commission blindly agreed, that if the sale of the materials is 
significant; i.e., "not just incidental to the services being 
provided," then the services must likewise be taxed along with 
the tangible personal property. This is flatly wrong. 
In Western Leather, Justice Wolfe explained in a con-
curring opinion what the Commission and Auditing Division have 
failed to realize, or refused to recognize. That is, if tangible 
personal property is so incidental to the sale of services, then 
"for practical reasons they [the tangible personal property] can-
not be considered a sale." Western Leather at 530. However, 
services do not become taxable if the cost of material becomes 
"non-incidental." The only time services are taxed is "when an 
article is sold and the servicing of the same is incidental to 
the sale is such a small part of the price of the whole, such 
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value of the services cannot be subtracted from the sale price." 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus the proper focus is on the incidental 
nature of services rendered, not the chemicals or cement pro-
vided. If these services are not incidental, then they are not 
taxable. That is the established law. On the basis of 
uncontroverted evidence, the services BJ-Titan sells comprise on 
the average 70% of the entire operation sold. To deem that inci-
dental, as the Tax Commission apparently does, is ludicrous. 
In an attempt to discount the significance of 
BJ-Titan's services, the Auditing Division analogized BJ-Titan's 
operations to a ready-mix concrete retailer who does nothing more 
in its sale of concrete than show up at a construction site and 
pour concrete from a cement truck. Not only is this an inaccu-
g 
rate and inappropriate analogy , but the Commission has ignored 
9 Calon Anderson likewise testified at the Formal Hearing that 
this was not a good analogy (Tr. at 174-175): 
A. They have equated it to a ready-mix 
truck that simply backs up to a hole and 
dumps the load and drives off. I don't think 
this is a very good comparison. I think they 
would be more similar, if anything, to a 
cement subcontractor. And there are two 
types that I think they might equate to. One 
would be a cement contractor who lays out our 
interstate highways. That is quite often 
subcontracted out. They don't put in the 
entire interstate. They do the cement por-
tion of it. Or they might use the large 
machine. They would have a batch plant set 
up next to it. They would actually go out 
and apply that cement to the road base to 
make the freeway that you would drive on. 
That would be considered attaching and 
converting this cement into rea[l property. 
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the economic reality of BJ-Titanfs operations as well as the 
facts of the case. Why, for example, would anyone pay a 200% 
premium (assuming one-third charge for materials and two-thirds 
for labor) over the cost of the materials sold for the mere 
delivery of cement? The ready-mix company certainly does not 
charge, nor would anyone pay, a 200% premium to show up at a con-
struction site and pour concrete out of a truck. The reason the 
customer pays this premium to BJ-Titan is in consideration of the 
real and substantial services being performed. These services 
are not incidental to the sale of tangible personal property and 
cannot be taxed unless the Utah Legislature enacts a specific 
provision taxing them. Since the Legislature has chosen not to 
enact such a provision, services are not subject to a sales tax. 
McKendrick is Inapplicable. 
The Commission's justification for its decision is 
that BJ-Titan is a manufacturer of finished products and thus a 
retailer of tangible personal property. The Commission held: 
It is the synthesis of these two things that 
comprise the product, the tangible personal 
property and associated services that Peti-
tioner transfers to its customers. It is the 
synthesis of material and services that is 
subject to sales tax. 
1 0
 For example, recognizing that these types of activities are 
traditional non-taxable services, Texas enacted a specific occu-
pation tax on oil well stimulation services. See Texas Tax Code 
S 191.082 which imposes a tax "on each person who engages in the 
business of providing an oil well service for another for consid-
eration . . . ." Section 191.081 defines oil well services or 
gas well services as "cementing the casing seat of an oil or gas 
well, shooting, fracturing, or acidizing the sands or other foun-
dations of the earth in an oil or gas well . . . ." 
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Record at 60 (emphasis added). 
In support of this position, the Commission cited to 
McKendrick where this Court held that the manufacture of pros-
thetic devices was subject to sales tax on the full value of the 
finished product. In McKendrick, the imposition of a sales tax 
on the value of the prosthetic device was upheld because the tax-
payer was engaged in the manufacture or production of a finished 
product for sale. The Court recognized that any manufacturing 
concern in the business of producing a final product will have 
labor costs as well as material charges, and that raw materials 
may at times be very inexpensive relative to the finished prod-
uct. Thus, the relative cost of materials or labor may not be a 
relevant inquiry. 
The relevant inquiry was whether a finished product was 
being produced; i.e., "the process of transformation through var-
ious stages [wherein] the value [of the finished product] is 
steadily enhanced in proportion to the expenditure of time, 
energy an skill thereon." McKendrick at 178 (emphasis added). 
The Court gave the example of "a pound of iron ore, worth but a 
few cents, but which is mined, smelted, processed, tempered and 
fabricated into hair springs for watches worth thousands of dol-
lars per pound." Id. The Court then concluded that when a fin-
ished product "is sold its value is that of a finished product 
and not of the basic materials from which it was made." id. The 
focal point of this decision is the conclusion that the 
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manufacture of raw materials into a proportionately more valuable 
finished product is taking place. 
The Commission distorts McKendrick1s rationale in an 
attempt to tax the entire contract price of BJ-Titan's well stim-
ulation operations. The uncontroverted facts below make 
BJ-Titan's case easily distinguishable. Well stimulation ser-
vices are not rendered in the manufacture of raw materials to 
produce a proportionately more valuable finished product. The 
charge for services is in compensation for various testing, 
research, studies, and other analytical services and for the 
placement of tangible personal property in a well, not the manu-
facture of a finished product. 
Moreover, McKendrick is not applicable to the present 
case because the chemicals or cement placed in a well is not a 
finished product in which "during the process of transformation 
through various stages the value is steadily enhanced in propor-
tion to the expenditure of time, energy, and skills thereon." 
McKendrick at 178. For example, there are many different addi-
tives which may be mixed into a cement slurry depending on well 
conditions and desired placement of the cement in the well. 
These additives enhance, reduce, accelerate or depress the hydra-
tion of the cement. However, once the cement hydrates, it is 
ordinary cement. The hydrated cement is not the result of the 
synthesis of labor and materials to produce a proportionately 
more valuable finished product. It continues to be just cement. 
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It is the placement, not production, of these materials 
in the well which represent the services being performed by 
BJ-Titan. It is these services for which the customer contracts 
and pays, and which comprise the major portion of each invoice. 
The customer pays for a service, not a finished product. The 
uncontroverted facts are that well stimulation operations do not 
involve the manufacture of a finished product. See Tummurru 
Traders, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 
7 (September 19, 1990) (where the Court distinguishes real prop-
erty contractors from manufacturers). 
Consequently, this case is analogous to Hardy, not 
McKendrick, where this Court recognized that when a dentist fur-
nishes both materials and services, the materials are taxable if 
separately stated, but the services are not. In both Hardy and 
BJ-Titan a customer needs professional services or expertise. 
For the dental patient, a cavity needs filling. For a well 
owner, a well needs to be cemented or fractured. In both cases 
the dentist and BJ-Titan must have special technical expertise to 
accomplish the task. It is the application of this technical 
expertise for which they are being retained and compensated. In 
both cases, a detailed examination of the subject matter is made. 
In both cases materials are purchased from third parties which 
1 1
 Moreover, as to BJ-Titan1s acidizing and fracturing opera-
tions, there is no finished product at all. The chemicals or 
other materials pumped into a well are then pumped out. (See Tr. 
137). While in some cases sand or propping agents remain in the 
well, once again the material itself is no more valuable than 
before insertion in the well. 
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will be used in filling a cavity or cementing a well. Just as 
the dentist adds mercury to silver and other metals in mixing an 
amalgam to prepare the restorative material for a filling, so too 
does BJ-Titan prepare cement or chemicals to be used in cementing 
or fracturing to likewise ensure proper placement, bonding and 
sealings. Both perform certain laboratory work. Both the den-
tist and BJ-Titan are responsible for and personally install 
either the amalgam in the tooth or cement in the well. In both 
instances, the materials being provided would be of little value 
without the services of the dentist or BJ-Titan. 
In summarizing Hardy, this Court concluded: 
If the above quoted statutes are to be given 
effect there seems to be only two alterna-
tives: the petitioners either (1) itemize 
the materials and charge the sales tax 
thereon to their patients, or (2) pay the 
sales tax on the materials they purchase and 
use in rendering their professional services. 
Hardy at 1065. 
The Court in Hardy recognized that where services are a 
substantial and significant element of a transaction, only the 
tangible personal property being transferred can be taxed. In 
fact, there is no reference or finding in Hardy that just because 
the dentist prepares, mixes or installs materials used in fill-
ings (i.e., the synthesis of labor and materials) that a finished 
product is being produced or that the dentist is a manufacturing 
concern. Likewise, there is no test or inquiry in Hardy as to 
whether the services were "necessary" for the filling of a 
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cavity, although no one would dispute that without the dentist's 
services, the materials "are of little value11 to the patient. 
In the present case, BJ-Titan provides an itemized bill 
to its customers which separately reflects the service portion 
and the materials portion of each invoice. Tr. 63. Moreover, as 
prescribed by the Hardy Court, BJ-Titan collects a sales tax only 
on that portion of the invoice related to materials transferred. 
Accordingly, based upon Hardy, BJ-Titan1s services are not tax-
able and BJ-Titan properly collected sales tax on the materials 
portion of its billing. 
II. IF SERVICES ARE INCIDENTAL TO THE SALE OF TANGIBLE PER-
SONAL PROPERTY, THEN UNDER UTAH CASE LAW BJ-TITAN MUST 
BE A REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTOR. 
Rule R865-58S of the Commission's Administrative Rules 
provides, in part, that "the sale of real property is not subject 
to the tax nor is the labor performed on real property." (Empha-
sis added.) 
No one disputes the fact that if BJ-Titan is a real 
property contractor with respect to its well stimulation opera-
tions, the labor it renders in the conversion of tangible per-
sonal property into real property is not subject to a sales/use 
tax. However, the Commission rejected BJ-Titan1s claim that it 
is a real property contractor, again contrary to law and 
uncontroverted evidence. 
The Commission's sole rationale for rejecting 
BJ-Titan's status as real property contractor is that BJ-Titan 
failed to pay sales tax on materials it purchased, instead of 
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charging its customer sales tax on materials it sold. Record at 
61-62. This rationale wrongly elevates form over substance. 
Following the Commission's strained logic, had BJ-Titan neither 
charged nor collected any sales tax from its well stimulation 
operations (on the basis the materials furnished were inciden-
tal), the Commission would be precluded from imposing a tax 
12 because the form would prevail over substance. 
The Commission's conclusion that BJ-Titan is not a real 
property contractor is short-sighted and arbitrary. The record 
establishes through uncontroverted evidence that the overriding 
objective of any well stimulation service is the proper placement 
of chemicals or cement at certain critical points in a well. 
BJ-Titan is retained because it has the expertise and technology 
to ensure the proper placement of cement and chemicals in a well. 
In fact, the Commission specifically found that BJ-Titan performs 
cementing services which "involve the placement of various 
cementing compositions, fluids and slurry compositions, into var-
ious places in the well." Record at 54. 
With respect to cementing services, no one disputes the 
fact that the cement becomes permanently attached to the real 
property. The Commission so found. Record at 56. Likewise, in 
1 2
 Carrying this logic one step further, BJ-Titan (and any 
other taxpayer) could now stop paying sales tax knowing that the 
form of payment (or lack thereof) will take precedence over the 
substance of the transaction. On the contrary, taxing statutes 
should be enforced in the opposite manner; i.e., a specific hold-
ing should used on the substance of a transaction, not its 
form. 
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some acidizing and fracturing services, certain materials or 
13 propping agents become permanently attached to real property. 
The Commission also found that without BJ-Titan's expertise, the 
cement or chemicals are of little value. Record at 55. Finally, 
the Commission found that the customer is purchasing the final 
product in the hole, which "has value to the customers of 
BJ-Titan only after the materials and services [of BJ-Titan] have 
been provided to the customers.n Record at 55. 
Given these findings of fact, it is incomprehensible 
why BJ-Titan is not treated as a real property contractor; i.e., 
the party who converts tangible personal property. On the con-
trary, having just made all those findings as to how BJ-Titan is 
intimately involved in taking raw materials and creating a valu-
able finished product as placed in the well, the Commission then 
makes a finding that it is the well operator who is the real 
property contractor - a party who has no expertise, no equipment, 
no capabilities and does none of the actual installation of mate-
rials in the well. This conclusion is grossly in error, contrary 
to case law, and the uncontroverted evidence. 
In Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408, 410 (1942) this Court stated that the 
1J
 Transcript at 137: 
Mr. Pacheo: Is it pumped back out of the wells? 
The witness: [Mr. Cramer]: Hopefully must do. The sand 
gets left in. And what that sand does in effect, it gives you a 
lateral well bore. We're creating a lateral flow channel in that 
reservoir. 
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real property contractor is the party who consumes personal prop-
erty by converting it to real property: 
The paramount question then turns upon the 
proposition of whether the contractors to 
whom plaintiffs sold their products were 
"users" or "consumers" within the meaning of 
the act or whether they were mere dealers in 
the products reselling to the third parties. 
The Court cited to the case law of another jurisdic-
tion, which had a similar taxing statute, and cited with approval 
that court's rationale which held that building, paving and sewer 
contractors were consumers of materials used to construct edi-
fices and thus were real property contractors. 
The court stated that in "its judgment the 
contractors in this case did not buy the 
materials in question for the purpose of 
reselling such materials to the city. They 
were under contract to deliver to the city a 
finished product. It was the inseparable 
commingling of labor and material that pro-
duced a finished product. 
14 Utah Concrete at 410 (emphasis added). 
The Court also held that the contractors were consumers 
because they "are the last persons in the chain [of title] to 
deal with such products before incorporation into a separate 
entity and before such products lost their identity as such." 
Id. at 411. This Court has most recently reaffirmed its holdings 
in Utah Concrete in Tummurru Trades, Inc. where it stated: 
In distinguishing contractors from manufac-
turers of other items, the Utah Concrete 
court stated: 
1 4
 This case is even more relevant to BJ-Titan because part of 
the materials referred to above would have included cement used 
in the construction of the buildings, paving and sewers. 
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[I]n the instant case, contractors purchase 
the pipes, culverts and cinder blocks for the 
purpose of using and consuming them by incor-
porating them as one of many units which go 
to make up buildings, structures, or roads, 
as the case might be, and not for reselling 
them as such in their original form, but for 
the purpose of changing their very nature 
from personal to real property. In short, 
labor and many other materials enter along 
with the plaintiffs' products to make up the 
particular structure, and they are all used 
or consumed in the process of producing a new 
entity. 
Tummurru at 7 (emphasis added, citation omitted). 
Based on these principles, BJ-Titan is a real property 
contractor. BJ-Titan does not buy chemicals or cement for the 
purpose of resale. Tr. 76. BJ-Titan is contracted to achieve a 
result, to stimulate flow from a well by placing concrete or 
chemicals at specific locations in a well. Tr. 138. BJ-Titan is 
the last party to deal with the materials before incorporation 
into the well. Tr. 92. The well owner or operator takes no part 
in the actual placement of chemicals or cement in ground. Tr. 
92. BJ-Titan supervises and monitors the installation of cement 
in the well and operates all the equipment. Tr. 85, 89 and 93. 
Calon Kay Anderson, a former Assistant Director with 
the Commission's Auditing Division, and an auditor for 19 years, 
likewise testified that in his expert opinion, BJ-Titan was a 
real property contractor. Mr. Anderson stated that in auditing 
for sales tax liability he focuses on two criteria in determining 
status as a real property contractor. One, "[d]oes it [the mate-
rials] become a permanent part of the realty?" Tr. 176. Second, 
who is "the party who actually converted that property into 
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realty?" Tr. 173. With respect to cementing services, Mr. 
Anderson concluded that BJ-Titan would "certainly be a real prop-
erty contractor" (Tr. 177): 
What sways me to that is that they are per-
forming all of the labor, at least based on 
the materials that I have reviewed, they are 
performing the labor that converts this 
cement into its final product or final form. 
In other words, you don't have the owner of 
the well coming out and doing additional 
things to that cement after it's poured. 
Id. 
The Commission's rejection of BJ-Titan's status as a 
real property contractor is inconsistent with its own findings. 
First, the Commission denies BJ-Titan's claim that its services 
are not incidental to sale of tangible personal property by con-
cluding that such services are "a necessary component of the 
final product," and finding that BJ-Titan has synthesized its 
services and material into a final product. Then the Commission 
blatantly ignores this conclusion (that BJ-Titan's services are 
necessary to the production and installation of the final prod-
uct) and the case law (that real property contractors are not 
manufacturers) to avoid a finding that BJ-Titan is a real prop-
erty contractor. To conclude that the customer is not purchasing 
services, but rather a finished product (where services and mate-
rials are synthesized) as placed in a well (Record at 55) 
requires a conclusion that BJ-Titan is a real property contrac-
tor. Any other conclusion is arbitrary, without logic or merit. 
Second, a conclusion that BJ-Titan is not a real prop-
erty contractor presumes that there was no inter-relation or 
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synthesis of labor and material into a final product which there-
fore requires a conclusion that the services are not incidental 
to the purchase of tangible personal property. These unsupported 
conclusions demonstrate a troubling disregard of the 
uncontroverted record of the Formal Hearing. 
Accordingly, BJ-Titan is entitled to a holding that its 
services are not taxable, either because it is a real property 
contractor or because its services are not incidental to the sale 
of tangible personal property. 
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES BY BJ 
HUGHES HOLDING COMPANY TO BJ-TITAN, A NEWLY 
FORMED PARTNERSHIP, IS AN ISOLATED OR OCCA-
SIONAL SALE. 
Utah Code S 59-15-2(5) (1985-1986) provides that "the 
term 'retail sale1 is not intended to include isolated nor occa-
sional sales by persons not regularly engaged in business, . . . 
but no sale of a vehicle of a type required to be registered 
under the provisions of the motor vehicle laws of this state 
shall be deemed isolated or occasional for purposes of this act 
. . . ." Rule R865-38S provides, in part: 
Any sale of an entire business to a single 
buyer is an isolated or occasional sale and 
no tax applies to the sale of any assets made 
part of such a sale (with the exception of 
vehicles subject to registration). 
(Emphas i s added.) 
In 1985, BJ Hughes Holding Company contributed all of 
the operating assets used in its well stimulation operations to a 
newly formed partnership, BJ-Titan, for a 72% partnership 
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interest. Likewise Titan Services contributed all of its operat-
ing assets to BJ-Titan for a 28% partnership interest. The 
respective partnership interests are in proportion to the fair 
market value of assets and liabilities contributed to BJ-Titan. 
15 As this Court has explained in various cases, and as 
set forth in the Commission's own administrative rule, the sale 
of an entire business to a single buyer is an isolated or occa-
sional sale. Note that Rule 38S only requires that there be a 
single buyer. The fact that two separate corporations sold their 
separate lines of business to the same entity conducting a joint 
operation does not violate the rule. Each sale is a separate 
transaction which stands on its own. Nor does the fact that 
Hughes Tool Company, the parent corporation of BJ Hughes Holding 
Company, operates various distinct and separate lines of business 
prevent it from transferring one of those distinct and separate 
operating divisions, as an integrated business, and having that 
transfer qualify as an isolated or occasional sale. 
1 5
 Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 
P.2d 208 (1949); L.A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 23 Utah 2d 84, 457 P.2d 973 (1969) and Husky Oil 
Company of Delaware v. State Tax Commission, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 
1976). 
!6 See Geneva Steel, where this Court rejected the Tax Commis-
sion's argument that the sale to Geneva Steel of an integrated 
business was not an isolated or occasional sale because the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation was controlling various sepa-
rate and discrete businesses and in fact previously sold six 
other integrated businesses in Utah. Geneva at 213. 
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Apparently, the Commission does not dispute the fact 
that this contribution of assets to BJ-Titan qualifies as an iso-
lated or occasional sale, at least with respect to non-motor 
vehicle assets for a sales tax has not been assessed on these 
assets. As to the motor vehicles, the Commission held that the 
vehicles required to be titled or registered in Utah were subject 
to tax because they were not transferred in a qualified "business 
reorganization." This holding is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, the Commission's holding ignores the record and 
presumes that the motor vehicles transferred to BJ-Titan were all 
required to be registered or titled in Utah, and thus would not 
qualify as an isolated or occasional sale unless transferred in a 
qualified business reorganization. However, as Mr. Thomas testi-
fied, the motor vehicles contributed to BJ-Titan are titled and 
registered in Texas and have Texas apportionment plates. Tr. 66. 
While Texas remits a portion of fees collected to Utah based on 
use of vehicles in Utah, the vehicles are not otherwise regis-
tered or titled in Utah. Tr. 65. In fact, the Utah Motor Vehi-
cle Act specifically exempts "interstate commercial vehicles duly 
registered in another state and not owned by a resident of the 
state" from the "registration and certificate of title provisions 
of this chapter." See Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-19(1) (a). Being 
exempt from titling or registration requirements, when the vehi-
cles were transferred to BJ-Titan there was no re-titling or 
re-registration of the vehicles in Utah. All titling and regis-
tration was done in Texas, as assets of Texas entities. 
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Because the motor vehicles transferred to BJ-Titan are 
not required to be titled or registered in Utah, these assets, 
along with the other assets transferred to BJ-Titan, fall outside 
the scope of a "retail sale" as an isolated or occasional sale 
and are not subject to taxation. 
Notwithstanding the fact the motor vehicles were not 
registered or titled in Utah, the vehicles were transferred pur-
suant to a "business reorganization" and therefore qualify as an 
isolated or occasional sale. Utah Code S 59-15-2(5) provides, in 
part: 
that any transfer of any motor vehicle in a 
business reorganization where the ownership 
of the transferee organization is substan-
tially the same as to the ownership of the 
transferor organization shall be considered 
an isolated or occasion sale. 
(Emphas i s added.) 
The terms "business reorganization" and "substantially 
the same" are not defined by statute, rule or case law. However, 
the purpose of the "business reorganization" rule is clear; i.e., 
to not tax the transfer of motor vehicles to a new entity where 
the original owner continues his proprietary ownership interest 
in the motor vehicles vis-a-vis the new entity. In other words, 
where the formal structure of an entity carrying out a business 
operation has changed, but not its underlying ownership and 
operation, the reorganization of the business entity should not 
be treated as a retail sale. In fact, an argument can be made 
that there has not been a sale because the same person, before 
and after the transfer, owns the same assets. Nothing has 
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17 
changed. There has been no consideration for a sale to have 
taken place. For example, Utah Code S 59-15-2(2) (1985-1986) 
specifically provides that: 
An even exchange of tangible personal proper-
ties shall not be deemed a sale for purposes 
of this act, but in any transaction wherein 
tangible personal property is taken as part 
of the sales price of other tangible personal 
property, the balance valued in money or 
other consideration shall be deemed a sale. 
(Emphasis added). The statute seems to say when there is an 
exchange of property, the sales tax only applies on that portion 
of the transaction where a taxpayer has "sold" his property and 
received cash or other consideration. In the present case, 
BJ-Titan could argue that no sale has taken place because the 
only thing it received was a proprietary interest in the very 
property it transferred. There was no sale for cash. 
While "business reorganization" is not statutorily 
defined, a "reorganization" is a technical term with a specific 
meaning. The most common and prevailing reference to the reorga-
nization of a business is that found in the tax laws. In fact, 
the Commission consulted the tax laws in attempting to define 
1 7
 See IBEC Industries, Inc. v. Lindley, 405 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio 
1980) (the reorganization of a corporation by contributing the 
assets and liabilities of a division in exchange for stock of a 
newly-formed subsidiary is not a taxable sale for lack of consid-
eration); and Roberts & Sons, Inc. v. Kosydar, 330 N.E.2d 437 
(Ohio 1975) (transfer of partnership assets, including motor 
vehicle registered in the name of one of the partners but used in 
partnership business, to newly-formed corporation where share-
holders maintained same percentage ownership as in partnership 
held not a taxable sale for lack of consideration); see also 
Northern Telecom Inc. v. Olsen, 679 S.W.2d 488 (Tenn. 1984). 
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"substantially the same" under the business reorganization rule. 
"[B]etween Joe Zvonik and Don Bosch and I, I'm the one that sug-
gested the 80 percent rule, because it was at least something we 
could find in writing in the I.R.S. Code." Tr. 241 (emphasis 
added) (Testimony of Kenneth Cook, Field Audit Supervisor of the 
Commission's Auditing Division). 
Reference to the definition of a business reorganiza-
tion as used in the tax laws is most appropriate because the 
underlying purpose for not imposing an income tax on business 
reorganizations is the same for not subjecting it to a sales tax; 
i.e., a business reorganization should not be subject to tax if 
there is a continuation of the business enterprise under a modi-
fied form and the owners have a continued participation in the 
entity's control, earnings and assets. Continuity of propriety 
interest is the linchpin of non-taxation because as long as own-
ership continues in the same person, there has been no sale or 
18 transfer of ownership. Thus an appropriate interpretation of 
the term "business reorganization" would be those business trans-
actions which are statutorily treated as non-taxable sales or 
exchanges because to qualify as a tax-free incorporation or reor-
ganization there must exist continuity of proprietary interest. 
The Commission's view on what may qualify as a business 
reorganization is inconsistent and nonsensical. On one hand, the 
Commission seems to agree that a "business reorganization" should 
See footnote 14 above. 
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be defined as used in the tax laws (Tr. at 241), but then takes a 
position inconsistent with the tax definition of a business reor-
ganization. For example, the Commission ruled as a conclusion of 
law that: 
Two business entities transferring assets to 
form and organize a new legal entity does not 
constitute a business reorganization. 
Instead, the two original entities have 
formed a new and separate entity. 
Record at 58. 
This is the technical description of a consolidation; 
i.e., "the combination of two or more corporations into a newly 
19 
created entity." Thus the Commission, as a matter of law, 
ruled that consolidations are not business reorganizations. How-
ever, the definition of a "reorganization" as established in Utah 
Code S 59-7-115(9)(a) (emphasis added) specifically includes 
20 
consolidations: 
(a) "Reorganization" means: 
(1st) a merger or consolidation (including 
the acquisition by one corporation of at 
least a majority of the voting stock and at 
least a majority of the total number of 
shares of all other classes of stock of 
another corporation, or substantially all the 
properties of another corporation); 
1 9
 See Bittker and Eustice, Federal Taxation of Corporations 
and Shareholders, page 14-32, Fifth Edition (Abridged Student 
Edition). 
2 0
 Reference to I.R.C. S 368(a)(1) would likewise be appropri-
ate as the state code follows the federal reorganization 
provisions. 
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A second inconsistency in the Commission's treatment of 
what qualifies as a business reorganization is found in its deci-
sion on what constitutes "substantially the same" in a business 
reorganization. The Commission ruled that a 72% interest in a 
new entity following a business reorganization does not consti-
21 tute "substantially the same." On behalf of the Commission's 
Auditing Division, Mr. Cook testified that 80% was the threshold 
level to constitute "substantially the same" "because it was at 
least something that we could find in writing in the IRS Code." 
Tr. 241. While BJ-Titan agrees that there are various 80 percent 
rules in the IRS Code, as applied to the mainstay of business 
reorganizations; i.e., the statutory merger, there is no such 
test as an 80 percent rule. The Court need look no further than 
Utah Code S 59-7-115(9) (a), cited above, to see that a business 
may go through a reorganization in the form of a merger and the 
applicable threshold control level is majority control (over 
50%). 
Two important legal points concerning reorganizations 
must be emphasized. One, a reorganization of a business may 
qualify as a reorganization when only a majority ownership inter-
. . . 22 
est is retained in the surviving legal entity. Two, it is 
2 1
 BJ Hughes Holding Company owned a 72% interest in BJ-Titan 
after the business reorganization. 
2 2
 See I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568 which similarly 
requires a 50% equity ownership in the new entity to maintain a 
continuity of proprietary interest. 
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possible to have two transferor entities in a reorganization, in 
which case the test for control is done on a combined basis. See 
Utah Code S 59-7-115(9) (a) (1st) and (2nd). This is especially 
true with respect to the tax-free incorporation of a corporation 
or formation of a partnership. See S 59-7-115(2)(e). 
As to partnerships, the Utah Code adopts and follows 
the federal treatment as to the tax-free formation of a 
23 partnership; thus I.R.C. S 721 (emphasis added) is applicable 
and provides the following: 
No gain or loss shall be recognized to a 
partnership or to any of its partners in the 
case of a contribution of property to the 
partnership in exchange for an interest in 
the partnership. 
The present case is in reality a business reorganiza-
tion in the form of a consolidation. BJ-Hughes Holding Company 
transferred its entire line of business operations and Titan Ser-
vices transferred its entire line of business operations to cre-
ate BJ-Titan. Because the original owners of the underlying 
business operations have continued their proprietary ownership 
interest therein, there is no reason why this restructuring 
should fall outside the scope of a business reorganization. This 
type of contribution of business operations to a new entity is 
exactly the type of business reorganization that Mr. Cook testi-
fied was intended to be exempt from sales tax. See Tr. at 240. 
23 See Sections 59-10-301, 59-10-112 and 59-10-103(2). 
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IV. THE AUDITING DIVISION FOLLOWED A POLICY OF 
TAXING MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSFERS ON AN AGGRE-
GATE BASIS. 
In the alternative to Argument III above, BJ-Titan 
maintains that in 1985, (and previously), the Commission followed 
a policy of taxing motor vehicle transfers on an "aggregate" 
basis. Calon Kay Anderson, a former Assistant Director of the 
Commission's Auditing Division, testified that such a policy, 
albeit informal, did exist, and was followed by the Commission 
for a number of years. Tr. 159-160. Under the "aggregate" rule, 
a sales tax is assessed on the value of assets transferred to a 
partnership based on the non-contributing partner's equity owner-
ship in the partnership. In other words, since BJ Hughes Holding 
Company had a 72% ownership interest in the BJ-Titan partnership, 
it (or BJ-Titan as its successor) should have paid sales taxes on 
28% of the value of vehicles transferred to BJ-Titan, under the 
"aggregate" rule. Implementation of the "entity" rule, later 
imposed by the Auditing Division without the benefit of a rule 
change, would tax BJ-Titan on 100% of the value of vehicles 
transferred. See Tr. 242-243. 
Notwithstanding unchallenged testimony, the Commission 
ruled that "the opinion testimony of the Petitioner's witness 
[Mr. Anderson] was insufficient to establish that such policy 
[the "aggregate" rule] did indeed exist." Record at 63. Even 
assuming the Commission had latitude to disregard Mr. Anderson's 
testimony, it flatly ignored the documentary evidence to the same 
effect presented at the Formal Hearing. Exhibit 5 (Record at 
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226-227) is Mr, Anderson's memorandum to the Commissioners, dated 
January 21, 1986 — written while Mr. Anderson was still an 
employee of the Commission as Assistant Director to the Auditing 
Division. In this memorandum Mr. Anderson states: 
The Auditing Division has maintained a policy 
of exempting the fair market value of the 
vehicle multiplied by the contributing part-
ner's ownership interest or conversely we 
have taxed the portion of the value of the 
vehicle transferred to the other partners. 
* * * * 
2, Is our policy of taxing a portion of the 
fair market value based on ownership interest 
correct? 
This memorandum clearly established the existence of such a pol-
icy, which was also acknowledged in an Attorney General Informal 
Opinion issued in 1986. Record at 228. Again the evidence was 
uncontroverted, and again the Commission cavalierly ignored it. 
V. THE COMMISSION CANNOT MAKE A CHANGE IN POLICY 
WITHOUT A RULEMAKING PROCEEDING. 
In the alternative to Argument III above, and assuming 
the Court rules in favor of BJ-Titan under Argument IV above, 
BJ-Titan argues as follows. As to motor vehicles in a business 
reorganization, vehicles transferred will not be subject to a 
sales tax to the extent the ownership of the transferee organiza-
tion is "substantially the same" as the ownership of the 
transferor organization. While "substantially the same" is not 
defined, the Commission's Auditing Division followed the "aggre-
gate" rule, which is explained in Part IV of this brief, until 
1986 when an Attorney General's opinion recommended a change from 
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the "aggregate" rule to the "entity" rule. As to BJ-Titan, the 
Auditing Division changed its practice to an "entity" rule, which 
exempts only transfers where a single transferor maintains an 80% 
level of ownership in the transferee entity. In other words, BJ 
Hughes Holding Company (or BJ-Titan as its successor) was taxed 
upon 100% of the value of the vehicles transferred to BJ-Titan 
because BJ Hughes Holding Company owns less than 80% of the 
24 BJ-Titan business. 
The Commission's change from an "aggregate" rule to an 
"entity" rule clearly constituted a change in policy as applied 
not just to BJ-Titan, but to all taxpayers. BJ-Titan was 
adversely impacted by this change in tax policy because it had to 
pay tax on 100% of the value of vehicles transferred to the part-
nership (under the "entity" rule) rather than upon 28% (under the 
"aggregate" rule). As required by Utah case law and the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, the Commission cannot lawfully 
change those policies, which substantially impact taxpayers with-
out following rulemaking procedures. See Utah Code S 63-46a-l et 
sea.; Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board, 757 P.2d 882 (Utah 
1988); Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 
1986). Consequently, implementation of this change cannot 
lawfully be imposed upon BJ-Titan. 
2 4
 BJ-Titan is a Texas general partnership. In forming 
BJ-Titan, BJ Hughes Holding Company contributed 72% of the 
assets, including the motor vehicles at issue, and received a 72% 
interest in BJ-Titan. Titan Services contributed 28% of the 
assets. See Statement of Facts, H 21 and 22. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission1s Final Decision should be reversed 
because it fails to apply established law to uncontroverted 
facts. 
The facts are that BJ-Titan sells oil well stimulation 
services which are not incidental to its sale of tangible prop-
erty. The Commission should have ruled that such services are 
not taxable. In the alternative, the Commission should have 
ruled, again on the basis of uncontroverted facts, that BJ-Titan 
is a real property contractor who should have paid sales taxes to 
its vendors on its material cost and should not have collected 
sales taxes from its customers on the cost of materials and ser-
vices. Finally, the Tax Commission should have ruled that the 
transfer of vehicles to BJ-Titan in a business reorganization 
either did not constitute a sale or was an "isolated or occa-
sional" sale, and thus was outside the definition of a "retail 
sale" and the application of a sales tax. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 1990. 
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As used in this chapter: 
(0 ' 'Person* includes any individual, firm copar-
tnership, joint adventure, corporation, estate or 
trust, or any group or combination acting as a unit 
and the plural as well as the singular number unless 
the intention to give a more limited meaning is 
disclosed by the context. 
(2) 'Sale* or 'sales* includes installment and 
credit sales, every closed transaction constituting a 
sale, and also includes the sale of electrical energy, 
gas, sen ices, or entertainment taxable under the 
terms of this act. A transaction whereby the posses-
sion of property is transferred but the seller retains 
the ntle as security for the payment of the price 
shall be deemed a sale. An even exchange of 
tangible personal properties shall not be deemed a 
sale for purposes of this act, but in any transaction 
wherein tangible personal property is taken as pan 
pf *\** «al'* Dnce of other tangible personal 
property, the balance valued in money or other coT" 
nsideraoon shall be deemed a sale. 
(3) 'Wholesaler* means a person doing a 
regularly organized wholesale or jobbing business 
and selling to retail merchants, jobbers, dealers or 
other wholesalers, for the purpose of resale. 
(4) 'Wholesale* means a sale of tangible personal 
property by wholesalers to retail merchants, 
jobbers, dealers or other wholesalers for resale, and 
does not include a sale by wholesalers or retailers to 
users or consumers not for resale, except as 
otherwise specified. 
(5) 'Retailer' means a person doing a regularly 
organized retail business in tangible personal 
property, and selling to the user or consumer and 
not for resale, and includes commission merchants, 
auctioneers, and all persons regularly engaged in the 
business of selling to users or consumers within the 
state of Utah; but the term 'retailer* does not 
include farmers, gardeners, stockmen, pouitrymen 
or other growers or agricultural producer! 
producing and domg business on their own 
premises, except those who are regularly engaged in 
the business of buying or selling for a profit. The 
term 'retail sale* means every sale within the state 
of Utah by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or 
consumer, except sales defined as wholesale sales or 
otherwise exempted by the terms of this act; but the 
term 'retail sale' is not intended to include isolated 
nor occasional sales by persons not regularly 
engaged in business, nor seasonal sales of crops, 
seedling plants, garden or farm or other agricultural 
produce by the producer thereof, or the return to 
the producer thereof of processed agricultural 
products, but no sale of a vehicle of a type required 
to be registered under the provisions of the motor 
vehicle laws of this state shall be deemed isolated or 
occasional for the purposes of this act, except that 
any transfer of any motor vehicle in a business reo-
rganization where the ownership of the transferee 
organization is substantially the same as to the 
ownership of the transferor organization shall be 
considered an isolated or occasional sale. Any 
fanner or other agricultural producer who sells 
poultry, eggs or dairy products to consumers will be 
deemed to be a retailer making retail sales and such 
sales will not be exempt under the provisions of this 
act if such sales have an average monthly sales 
value of $125 or more. 
(6) Each purchase of tangible personal property 
or product made by a person engaged in the 
business of manufacturing, compounding for sale, 
profit or use, any article, substance or commodity, 
which enters into and becomes an ingredient or 
component pan of the tangible personal property or 
product which he manufactures, or compounds, and 
the container, label or the shipping case thereof, 
shall be deemed a wholesale sale and shall be 
exempt from taxation under this act; and for the 
purpose of this act, poultry, dairy and other 
livestock feed, and the components thereof, 
including all baling ties and twine used in the baling 
of hay and straw and all fuel used for heating 
orchards, commercial greenhouses, domg a majority 
of their business in wholesale sales, and providing 
power for off highway type farm machinery, and all 
seeds and seedlings, are deemed to become 
component parts of the eggs, milk, meat and other 
livestock products, plants and plant products, 
produced for resale; and each purchase of such feed 
or seed from a wholesaler, or retailer, as well as 
from any other person shall be deemed a wholesale 
j a k and shall be exempt from taxation under this 
act; provided also that sprays and insecticides used 
in the control of insect pests, diseases and weeds for 
the commercial production of fruit, vegetables, 
feeds, seeds, and animal products shall be deemed a 
wholesale sale and exempt from taxation under this 
act; 
Each purchase of service as defined in section 59-
15-4(b) by a person engaged m compounding and 
selling a service which is subject to a tax under 
section 59-!5-4(b) and actually used in compound-
ing such taxable service shall be deemed a wholesale 
sale and shall be exempt from taxation under this 
act. 
(7) When right to possession, operation, or use of 
any arode of tangible personal property is granted 
under a lease or contract and such transfer of poss-
ession would be taxable if an outright sale were 
made, such lease or contract shall be considered the 
sale- of such article and the tax shall be computed 
and paid by the vendor or lessor upon the rentals 
paid, regardless of the duration of the lease or 
contract. 
(8) 'Tax' means either the tax payable by the 
purchaser of a commodity or service subject to tax, 
or the aggregate amount of taxes due from the 
vendor of such commodities or services during the 
period for which he is required to repon his collec-
tions, as the context may require. 
(9) 'Admission' includes seats and tables reserved 
or otherwise, and other similar accommodations 
and charges made therefor and 'amount paid for 
admission' means the amount paid for such admis-
sion, exclusive of any admission tax imposed by the 
federal government or by tins act. 
(10) 'Purchase' means the price to the consumer 
exclusive of any tax imposed by the federal govern-
ment or by this act. 
(11) 'Motion picture exhibitor' means any person 
engaged in the business of operating a theatre or 
establishment in which motion, pictures are exhibited 
regularly to the public for a charge. isti 
59-15-4. Saks tax - Rase - Disposition of revesuse 
froaa temporary increase. 
From and after the effective date of this act there 
is levied and there shall be collected and paid: 
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible 
personal property made within the state of Utah 
equivalent to the following rates: (i) 4 -5 /8* from 
October 1, 1983, through June 30, 1986, (ii) 4-
38/64* from July 1, 1986, through December 31, 
1989, and (iv) 4 -1 /2* from January 1, 1990, and 
thereafter of the purchase price paid or charged, 
except that where a person takes, as a trade-in for 
part payment of the merchandise sold, tangible 
personal property other than money, that tax shall 
be computed and paid only upon the net difference 
between the selling price of the merchandise sold 
and the amount of the trade-in allowance. For the 
purpose of this subsection, currency and coinage 
constituting legal tender of the United States or of a 
foreign nation, all sales of gold, silver, or platinum 
ingots, bars, medallions, or decorative coins, not 
constituting legal tender of any nation, with a gold, 
silver, or platinum content of not less than 8 0 * 
shall not be considered tangible personal property. 
The sale of coal, fuel oU, and other fuels shall not 
be subject to the tax except as hereinafter provided^ 
(b) A tax equivalent to the following percenta-
ges of the amount paid: 
(1) 4-5 /8* from October 1, 1983, through June 
30, 1986. 38/64* from July 1, 1986, through 
December i l , 1989, and 4 -1 /2* from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid to common 
carriers or telephone or telegraph corporations as 
defined by Section 54-2-1, whether the corporations 
are municipally or privately owned, for all transpo-
rtation, telephone service, or telegraph service; but 
the tax shall not apply to intrastate movements of 
freight and express or to street railway fares or to 
the sale of newspapers and newspaper subscriptions. 
(2) 4 -5 /8* from October 1, 1983, through June 
30, 1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and 4 -1 /2* from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid to any 
person as defined in this act including municipal 
corporations, for gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, 
or other fuels sold or furnished for commercial co-
nsumption. For purposes of this Subsection (b), 
commercial consumption shall not include the 
amounts of these fuels sold or furnished to 
apartment houses or other similar buildings where 
persons maintain their places of r e r i d e ^ J ^ o n r y 
TOine extent these fuels are used for these places of 
residence. 
(3) 1-5/8* from October 1, 1983, through June 
30, 1986, 1-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and 1-1/2* from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid to any 
person as defined in this act, including municipal 
corporations, for gat, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, 
or other fuds sold or furnished for domestic or re-
sidential use, including use by persons residing in 
apartment houses or similar buildings. 
(c) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 4-
5 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and 4-1 /2* from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid for all 
nasals furnished by any restaurant, eating house, 
hotel, drugstore, dub, or other place. 
(d) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 4-
5 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and 4 -1 /2* from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid for 
admission to any place of amusement, entertainme-
nt, or recreation. 
(e) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 4-
5 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 
1986, 4-38/64* from Jury 1, 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and 4 -1 /2* from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid or charged 
for all services for repairs, renovations, cleaning, or 
washing of tangible personal property or for instal-
lation of tangible personal property rendered in 
connection with other tangible personal property. 
(0 A tax equivalent to the following rates: 4-
5 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1( 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and 4 -1 /2* from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid or charged 
for tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court acc-
ommodations and services. This subsection shall not 
apply to the amount paid or charged for tourist 
home, motel, hotel, or trailer court where residency 
is maintained continuously under the terms of a 
tease or similar agreement for a period of not less 
than 30 days. 
(g) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 4-
5 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and 4 -1 /2* from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid or charged 
for laundry and dry cleaning services. 
(h) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 4-
5 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and 4-1 /2* from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid or charged 
for leases and rentals of tangible personal property, 
when situs of the property is in this state, or if the 
lessee took possession in this, state; provided, 
however, the tax need not be paid if the leased 
properly is used exclusively in a foreign state. 
TTie revenue collected from (i) a 1 /8* increase in 
sales tax from July 1, 1983, through June 30, 1986, 
shall be deposited in the General Fund Restricted-
Executive Reserve Account, and (ii) a 6 / 6 4 * 
increase in sales tax from July l t 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, shall be deposited in the Water 
Resources Conservation and Development Fund, ues 
59-15-4.6. AppfopriatkHi of reresme to 1965 Utah 
So .much of the sales tax revenue collected 
pursuant to this act as is necessary to pay the 
interest on and retire the principal of bonds author-
ized by the Thirty-Sixth Legislature for the 
programs prescribed in House Bill number 64 [ch. 
133] of the Thirty-Sixth Legislature [63-32-1 to 63-
32-21] to be conducted by the Utah state building 
board and Utah park and recreation commission 
shall be appropriated to the 1965. Utah building 
bonds interest and sinking fund [63-32-8] to make 
such payments of interest and principal in accorda-
nce with the payment schedule prescribed in said 
bonds. Provided, however, this section will not 
become operable unless and until other funds appr-
opriated by the legislature for the purposes of this 
section have been exhausted. im 
R865-01S. Sales and Use Taxes 
Distinguished Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Title 59, Chapter 12 
Mf*41S- l . Stfttt aae Use Tax 
A^Ihe^aiestax is imposed upon saka of tangible 
peraonai property made within the state of Utah* 
regardless of where such property u intended to be 
used, and on the amount paid or charged for all 
services for repairs and renovations of tangible 
personal property or for installation of tangible 
peraonai property rendered in connection with other 
tangible personal property. 
B. The use tax is imposed upon the_user storage 
or other consumption of tangible personal property, 
and upon the amount paid or charged for the serv-
ices for repairs or renovations of tangible personal 
property or installation of tangible personal prop-
erty m connection with other tangible personal 
property, if the tangible personal property is for 
ttse^ storage, or consumption m Utah; and, orchna-
riry, if the transaction does not take place within the 
state of Utah. 
C. The two taxes are compensating taxes, one 
supplementing the other, but both cannot be appli-
cable to the same transaction. The rate of tax is the 
D. The distinguishing factor in determining which 
tax at applicable is normally the place where the sale 
or service takes place. If the sale is made far Utah, 
the sales tax applies. If the sale is made elsewhere, 
theuse tax applies. 
ttST 5*12 
RK5-02S. Nature of Tax Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103 
MB42S.1. SsJ« aa* Ust Tti 
RS*5-02S-1. Sales and Use Tax 
A ~ t h e sales and use taxes are transaction taxes 
hnposfd upon certain retail sales and leases of tan-
gible personal property, as well as upon certain 
services. 
B.*The tax is not upon the articles sold or furni-
shed,- but upon the transaction, and the purchaser is 
the actual taxpayer. The vendor is charged with the 
duty of collecting the tax from the purchaser and of 
paying the tax to the state. 
\S** 9M2-M3 
RS65-26S. Tangible Personal Property 
Defined Pursuant to Utah Code Arm. 
859-12-11* 
RM*-2*SrL Sate tadUst Tax 
BM5-26S-1. Sales and Use Tax 
A, Tangible personal property* means all goods, 
wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities, all 
tangible or corporeal things and substances which 
are dealt in or capable of being possessed or exch-
anged. It does not include real estate or any interest 
therein, bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, 
notes and other evidence of debt, coins and curr-
ency, insurance policies, or governmental licenses. 
The term does not include water in pipes, conduits, 
ditches* or rescnroks but doer include water m 
bottles, tanks, or other containers. Tangible pert* 
onal property includes all other physkaQy existing 
articles or things, indnrimg property severed from 
real estate. 
IM7 S*-tt~US 
RK5-27S. Retail Saks Defined Pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §59-12-102 
RM9-r7S-l. Sates avi Uat To: 
Rj*5-27S-1. Saks and Use Ttx 
A«*The term 'retail fate* has a broader meaning 
fiasrthesaierof-tangftfe personal property. It ind-
odea any traaaferty earriiangn, orr barter -whether 
cnaaffliiaiai or for* consideration by a person doinf 
bipnien in such^ c^onvncNin o^r^ servicc; either as a 
regularly organized principal endeavor or as-an? 
adjunct thereto. The price of the service or tangible-
pcrjonal property, the Quantity sold, or the extant 
of'the* clientele are not factors which determine 
whether ornot it if* retail sale*-
B^Retail sale aba includes certain leases and 
rentals of tangible personal property as defined in 
Rule R865-32S, accemnxictaions as defined In 
Role RS65-79S,~ services performed on tangible 
personal property as defined in Rules R865-51& 
and R863-78S, admissions as defined in Rules 
R865-33S and R865-34S sales of meals as defined 
in-Rules RS65-61S and R865-62S, and sates of 
certain public utility services. 
C. A particular retail sale or portion of the setting 
price may not be subject to a sates or use tax. The 
status of the exemption is governed by the ctrcum-
staaces in each case.- See other rules for specific and 
general exemption definitions* Rule R865-30S for 
definition of sates price and Rule R86S-72S cove-
ring trade-ins. 
Iff? 3M2-1S2 
R865-38S. Isolated and Occasional Sales 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-106 
RS65-38S-1. Sales and Use Tax 
R865-38S-1. Sales and Use Tax 
A. Sales made by officers of a court, pursuant to 
court orders, are occasional sales, with the exception 
of sales made by trustees, receivers, assignees and 
the like, in connection with the liquidation or 
conduct of a regularly established place of business. 
Examples of casual sales are those made by sheriffs 
in foreclosing proceedings and sales of confiscated 
property. 
B. If a sale is an integral pan of a business whose 
primary function is not the sale of tangible personal 
property, then such sale is not isolated or occasi-
onal. For example, the sale of repossessed radios, 
refrigerators, etc., by a finance company is not 
isolated or occasional. 
C Sales of vehicles subject to the registration 
laws of this state are not isolated or occasional 
sales, except that any transfer of any motor vehicle 
in a business reorganization where the ownership of 
the transferee organization is substantially the same 
as the ownership of the transferror organization 
shall be considered an isolated or occassional sale. 
D. Isolated or occasional sales made by persons 
not regularly engaged in business are not subject to 
the tax. The word "business" refers to an enterprise 
engaged in seiling tangible personal property or 
taxable services notwithstanding the fact that the 
sales may be few or infrequent. Any sale of an 
entire busmess to a single buyer is an isolated or 
occasional sale and no tax applies to the sale of any 
assets made part of such a sale (with the exception 
of vehicles subject to registration). 
E. The sale of used fixtures, machinery, and 
equipment items is not an exempt occasional sale if 
the sale is one of a senes of sales sufficient in 
number, amount, and character to indicate the seller 
deals in the sale of such items. 
F Sales of items at public auctions do not qualify 
as exempt isolated or occasional sales. 
G. Wholesalers, manufacturers, and processors 
who primarily sell at other than retail are not 
making isolated or occasional sales when they sell 
such tangible personal property for use or consum-
ption. 
1917 59-11-104 
R865-58S. Materials and Supplies Sold 
to Owners, Contractors and Repairmen 
of Real Property Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§59-12-102 and 59-12-103 
BNS6SS-1. Saks tad Use T o 
RSC5-58S-L Saki and Use Tax 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real 
property contractors and repairmen of real property 
is generally subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal property 
into real property is the consumer of the personal 
property since he is the last one to own it as pers-
onal property. 
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or 
repair real property; regardless of the type of cont-
ract entered into - whether it is a lump sum, time 
and material, or a cost-plus contract. 
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the 
tax nor is the labor performed on real property. For 
example, the sale of a completed home or building 
is not subject to the tax, but sales of materials and 
supplies to contractors and subcontractors are 
taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. This 
is true whether the contract is performed for an 
individual, a religious institution, or a governmental 
instrumentality. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable 
institutions and government agencies are exempt 
only, if sold as tangible personal property and the 
seller does not install the material as an improve-
ment to realty or use it to repair real property. 
B. If the contractor or repairman purchases all 
materials and supplies from vendors who collect the 
Utah tax, no sales tax license is required unless the 
contractor makes direct sales of tangible personal 
property in addition to the work on real property. 
1. If direct sales are made, the contractor shall 
obtain a sales tax license and collect tax on all sales 
of tangible personal property to final consumers. 
2. The contractor must accrue and report tax on 
all merchandise bought tax-free and used in perf-
orming contracts to improve or repair real property. 
Books and records must be kept to account for both 
material sold and material consumed. 
C. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors 
for use in out-of-state jobs are taxable unless 
sold in interstate commerce in accordance with Rule 
R865-44S. 
D. This rule does not apply to contracts whereby 
the retailer sells and installs personal property which 
does not become part of the real property. See Rules 
R865-51S, R865-39S, and R865-78S for infor-
mation dealing with installation and repair of tang-
ible personal property. 
I ff? S9.U-M2, SM2-M3 
APPENDIX B 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
BJ-TITAN SERVICES & HUGHES TOOL CO., 
Petitioner, ) 
: FINDINGS OF FACT, 
v. ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: AND FINAL DECISION 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ) 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : Appeal No. 88-1644 
Respondent : 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for 
a formal hearing on February 21, 1989. James E. Harward, Hearing 
Officer, Joe B. Pacheco, Commissioner and G. Blaine Davis, 
Commissioner heard the matter for and in behalf of the Tax 
Commission. 
Present and representing the Petitioner was Maxwell A. 
Miller, Attorney at Law. Present and representing the Respondent 
was Brian Tarbet, Assistant Attorney General. 
The appeal represented the consolidation of two cases: 
Hughes Tool Company v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, appeal No. 88-1500; and BJ-Titan Services Company v. 
Appeal No. 88-1644 
Auditing Division of theJJtah State Tax Commission, appeal No. 
88-1644. The identical nature of the issues involved in the two 
cases made the consolidation practical. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales tax. 
2. Pursuant to the audit of Hughes Tool Company for the 
period October 1, 1983 through March 31, 1985, the Auditing 
Division assessed additional sales and use tax in the amount of 
$239,842.89. 
3. Pursuant to an audit of BJ-Titan Services Company 
for the period of April 1, 1985 through September 30, 1986, the 
Auditing Division assessed additional sales and use tax in the 
amount of $116,574.11. 
4. Petitioners operate oil and gas well stimulation and 




(4) Nitrogen work. 
5. Cementing involves the placement of various 
cementing compositions, fluids, and slurry compositions, into 
various places in the well. The purpose of cementing is to 
stabilize the well and/or to separate zones within the well hole. 
6. Hydraulic fracturing involves the injection of 
hydraulic fluids that are created with various additives 
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into a well bore to extend the well bore laterally into the 
formation. 
7. Acidizing is an extension of hydraulic fracturing 
using hydrochloric acid in combination with other agents to 
improve the flow capacity of a well by dissolving deposits that 
may be plugging channels in the rock. 
8. In cementing, a special grade of Portland Cement is 
used with any combination of 54 additives, the use of which is 
dependent upon the conditions of the well. The actual formula of 
the cement used for each well is recommended by Petitioner's 
representative. 
9. Without the expertise of the employees of the 
Petitioner, the raw chemicals or cement are of little value to the 
well operators, and likewise the services are of little value to 
the well operators without the raw materials. 
10. Because neither the materials nor the services are 
of much value to the customers without the other, it is not 
important to the customer how the price is allocated between the 
materials and the services. The customer does not buy one without 
the other. Therefore, if only the materials were taxable tben 
BJ-Titan could reduce the taxes by simply reallocating the price 
from materials to services. 
11. The customer is purchasing the final product in the 
hole where it has its only value to the customer. The final 
product has value to the customers of BJ-Titan only after the 
materials and services together have been provided to the 
customers. 
-3-
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12. Petitioner did not pay sales tax on materials it 
purchased. Petitioner charged sales tax to its customers on the 
materials and remitted that amount to the State Tax Commission. 
The Petitioner did not charge sales tax on the portion of its 
invoice price which it claims was the labor portion. 
13. Concerning cementing services, BJ-Titan synthesizes 
materials and services to provide a finished product which 
stabilizes the pipe located in the well. Once poured, the cement 
cannot be removed. The cement permanently affixes the casing to 
the surrounding hole and becomes real property. 
14. When BJ-Titan delivers the products to the well 
operators, BJ-Titan makes its recommendations regarding the 
precise formulas to be used and the method of placement in the 
well. However, the well operators make the decisions to accept or 
reject the recommendations of BJ-Titan. The contracts contain a 
specific provision which states: "work done by BJ-Titan shall be 
under the direction, supervision and control of the owner, 
operator, or his agent and BJ-Titan will perform the work as an 
independent contractor and not as an employee or agent of the 
owner or operator.:: Thus, it is the well operators (customers of 
BJ-Titan) that convert the materials (cement) acquired from 
BJ-Titan into real property. 
15. The cementing services of BJ-Titan are similar to a 
ready mix concrete company that sells concrete to a building 
contractor and pumps it to the location where it is needed by the 
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contractor. In that case, as well as this case, the delivered 
product is subject to sales tax on the total charge, including the 
sellers cost for materials, labor and profit. In the case of a 
ready mix company selling and pumping concrete to a building 
contractor, when the concrete is converted to real property it is 
converted by the building contractor and not by the ready mix 
company. In this case, when the cement is converted to real 
property it is converted by the oil well owner and not by 
B.J.-Titan. 
16. In contrast to the cementing function, acidizing, 
fracturing, and nitrogen services are not operations in which the 
involved personal property becomes part of or attached to real 
property. In each of these services the personal property used in 
stimulation becomes part of the production of the well and is 
returned when oil and other fluids are taken from the well. In 
these cases, BJ-Titan has sold the products to the final consumer, 
and sales tax should have been collected on that sale to the final 
consumer. 
17. In April 1985, Hughes Tool Company, through its 
holding company, BJ-Kughes Holding Company, and Titan Services 
Company, combined to form a partnership known as BJ-Titan Services 
Company. BJ-Hughes Holding Company contributed 72% of the new 
partnership's assets including the contribution of the motor 
vehicles in question. Titan Services Company contributed 28% of 
the assets. BJ-Hughes received a 71% interest in the partnership, 
and Titan Services received a 28% interest in the partnership. 
-5-
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Tax 
Commission now makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There is a tax levied on the purchaser for the amount 
paid for retail sales of tangible personal property made within 
the state. (Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103) 
2. Sales of tangible personal property to real property 
contractors and repairmen of real property are subject to sales 
tax. 
3. Sales of vehicles required to be titled or registered 
within the laws of this state are not exempt from sales taxes as 
isolated or occasional sales, except that any transfer of a 
vehicle in a business reorganization where the ownership of the 
transferee organization is substantially the same as the ownership 
of the transferrer organization shall be considered an isolated or 
occasional sale. (Utah State Tax Commission Administrative Rule 
R845-19-38S(c).) 
4. Two business entities Transferring assets to form and 
organize a new legal entity does not constitute a business 
reorganization. Instead, the two original entities have formed a 
new and separate entity. 
5. BJ-Titan is not a real property contractor within the 
meaning of R86 5-19-58S. Instead, the portion of its product 
which BJ-Titan has labeled as services is really charges "for 
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fabrication or installation which is part of the process of 
creating a finished article of tangible personal property" (the 
cement which is sold to the well operators) pursuant to 
R865-19-51S. 
ISSUES 
In both cases there are essentially two issues to be 
decided: 
1. Is sales and use tax imposed on all of the charges 
made by B-J Titan and Hughes Tool, or only on the portion of the 
charges which they have allocated to materials? 
2. Is the transfer of motor vehicles to BJ-Titan 
Services from BJ-Hughes Holding Company exempt from sales and use 
tax? 
IS THE SALES AND USE TAX IMPOSED ON THE TOTAL 
INVOICE PRICE FROM BJ-TITAN TO ITS CUSTOMERS, 
OR ONLY ON THE AMOUNT WHICH BJ-TITAN HAS 
DESIGNATED AS THE PORTION ALLOCABLE TO MATERIALS? 
In support of its position that the services are not 
subject to sales or use tax, the Petitioner advances two 
alternative theories: 
1. The services are not incidental to the sale of 
tangible personal property. Rather, services rendered are part of 
a comprehensive service and the sale of concrete or other well 
stimulation materials are incidental to that comprehensive service; 
2. The Petitioner is a real property contractor and is 
exempt from sales and use taxes, except for sales tax on the 
products which it purchases. 
-7-
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With respect to the Petitioner's argument that the 
services are not incidental to the sale of the materials used to 
case the wells and materials used in stimulating the wells, the 
Tax Commission finds the argument is not well taken. 
While it is accepted that without the expertise provided 
by the Petitioner the materials are virtually worthless for their 
intended purpose, it is also accepted, as the Respondent in its 
brief states that "All of Petitioner's 'services' without the 
actual materials would be worthless to its customers. Likewise 
the materials without the services to blend them into the correct 
product and deliver it into the property would likewise be of for 
(sic) less value. It is the synthesis of these two things that 
comprise the product, the tangible personal property and 
associated services that Petitioner transfers to its customers. 
It is this synthesis of material and services that is subject to 
sales tax" (brief of Respondent page 7). 
Where the Petitioner is in the business of oil and gas 
stimulation, the Petitioner operates as a retailer of tangible 
personal property. The services that it provides to its customers 
in the sale of these products is a necessary component of the 
final product and is taxable. 
This rationale is consistent with the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court in McKendrick v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 
2nd 418, 347 P2d 177, (1959). There, the plaintiff, a 
manufacturer of artificial limbs, claimed the sale of artificial 
limbs were exempt from sales tax. The Petitioner alleged that 
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what he was selling was a professional service in the making and 
fitting of the prosthetic devices and the materials used were such 
a small portion of the total charge that they were "merely 
incidental" to the service performed. 
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed with the Petitioner and 
stated: 
It is quite generally true that "materials", 
considered separate and apart from "services", 
are not worth much. The value of raw materials 
depends upon their abundance or scarcity. 
These are usually very small in comparison to 
the products into which they are fashioned. 
Its the taking of ore from the mine or the tree 
from the forest and then making them into 
something useful which makes the end product 
desirable and therefore valuable. 
During the process of transformation through 
various stages, the value is steadily enhanced 
in proportion to the expense of time, energy 
and skill thereon. An excellent example is the 
process by which a pound of iron ore, worth but 
a few cents, is mined, smelted, processed, 
tempered and fabricated into hair springs for 
watches worth thousands of dollars per pound. 
When one is sold its value is that of the 
finished product and not of the basic materials 
from which it was made. The same principle 
applies to the Petitioner's profits. Id. at 
419. 
With regard to the Petitioner's second argument that it 
is a real property contractor, the Tax Commission similarly finds 
such argument to be without merit. If the Petitioner were a real 
property contractor the sale to them of the materials in question 
would be subject to sales tax, and sales tax would be paid by the 
Petitioner and not by its customers. That, however, is not how 
the Petitioner conducted business. Here, the practice of 
Petitioner was to not pay sales tax on materials purchased by them 
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but rather, charge its customers sales tax and remit the taxes to 
the Tax Commission. Those actions were not those of a real 
property contractor but were those of a retail sales business 
which purchased the materials for later resale. 
It appears that the Petitioner would now ask that its own 
past actions which showed that it did not consider itself to be a 
real property contractor be disregarded simply because it is in 
its financial interest to do so. This the Tax Commission is not 
willing to do and finds such practice to be probative as to the 
true nature of the Petitioner's operation. 
IS THE TRANSFER OF MOTOR VEHICLES TO 
BJ-TITAN FROM BJ-HUGHES EXEMPT FROM SALES AND USE TAX 
Under Utah State Tax Commission Rule R855-19-38S, sales 
of motor vehicles are not exempt as isolated or occasional sales 
except "that any transfer of the vehicle in a business 
reorganization where the ownership of the transferee organization 
is substantially the same as the ownership of the transferrer 
organization shall be considered as an isolated or occasional 
sale". 
In the present case, BJ-Holding Company was created 
specifically to hold the assets of BJ-Hughes Services and become a 
partner with Titan Services in the formation of the partnership 
known as BJ-Titan Services. BJ-Holding Company contributed 72% of 
the assets of the new company including the motor vehicles in 
question. Titan Services contributed the remaining 28% of the 
assets. 
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Under the facts as set out above, it cannot be said that 
the ownership of the transferee organization (BJ-Titan) is 
substantially the same as the ownership of the transferrer 
organization (BJ-Holding Company). Therefore, the Petitioners 
have failed to meet the requirements of Rule R865-12-38S with 
respect to the transfer of vehicles. 
With regard to both issues, the Petitioner claims that 
the findings of the Auditing Division were contrary to established 
policies of the Tax Commission. Petitioner argued that the Tax 
Commission could not reverse such a policy without complying with 
the appropriate administrative rule making statutes. 
In support of this, the Petitioner offered the testimony 
of a single witness, a former employee of the Tax Commission, who 
testified that in his opinion certain policies regarding the two 
issues existed. 
The Tax Commission finds that the opinion testimony of 
the Petitioner's witness was insufficient to establish that such 
policy did indeed exist. More importantly, however, there was no 
evidence presented which showed that even if such policies were in 
effect, the Petitioner relied upon them to its detriment. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that 
the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence 
that its oil and gas stimulation services are exempt from sales 
and use tax. The Tax Commission also finds that the Petitioner 
has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Hughes Holding Company to 
BJ-Titan Services were exempt from sales and use taxes. The 
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findings of the Auditing Division are therefore affirmed, 
request of the Petitioner is denied. It is so ordered. 
DATED this £ day of ^ u J * U X ^ , 1990. 
The 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMM ITS SI ONT 
LJoe B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have ten (10) days after the date of the final order 
to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days after 
the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a petition for 
judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-13(1), 63-46b-14(2)(a) 
PFI/lgh/8677w 
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